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Abstract
Open and fair elections are paramount to modern
democracy. Although some people claim that the pencil-
and-paper systems used in countries such as Canada and
UK are still the best method of avoiding vote rigging,
recent election problems have sparked great interest in
managing the election process through the use of
electronic voting systems. It is a goal of this paper to
describe a voting system that is secret and secure as well
as verifiable and useable over an existing computer
network.
We have designed and implemented an electronic voting
system – Verifiable E-Voting (VEV) – with an underlying
protocol that secures the election process from malicious
practices at the same time as allowing voters and
candidates to verify the correctness of their votes.
1. Introduction
Open and fair elections and their appearance as such,
are paramount to modern democracy. The citizens of a
nation only have an interest in voting because they
believe that they truly determine by majority who will be
their representatives. Loss of trust in the voting system
can cause a whole country to lose faith in their system of
government. Although voters and candidates
predominantly try to secure the voting process, there is a
belief that fraudulent elections have been conducted (e.g.
Dominican Republic 1994, Malawi 1999, Sri Lanka 1999,
Haiti 2000 [1]). While many computer scientists have
been warning of the perils of the use of electronic voting
systems, the vendors of such systems have continued to
promote their products, claiming increased security and
reliability. The quest to find a solution for a secure voting
process has encouraged some people to jump on the
electronic voting train. Electronic voting systems have
much appeal. They can bring ease of use to voters,
election candidates, and election officials. Electronic
voting machines enhance the election process in the ways:
they can handle multiple languages, they can easily adapt
to the people with disabilities, and they provide faster
results. Although some assume that a computerized voting
process is totally reliable and will provide correct results
as well as making it impossible to alter the count, this is
not the case. As can be seen from the series of research
studies as well as recently published discussions in the
media, there is opinion that many of the positions put
forward by supporters of electronic voting are far from
the truth. As a simple example, it is possible that a
computer can easily display one set of data to the voter
while recording an entirely different vote. This could be
caused by a programming error or by a malicious design
of the system. In recent months electronic voting
machines have been criticized by researchers who say that
they can be interfered with to skew results, and it has been
shown that there have been inaccuracies in vote counting
records. Most of the machines in use leave no verifiable
record of the transaction.
2. Overview
While some states trust the pencil and paper voting
procedure, others have applied e-voting technology to
their democratic elections. As early as 1990, Brazil
employed electronic devices to help in the voting process.
Ever since then their voting infrastructure has been
improved resulting in all-electronic elections held in
October 2002. These voting machines used Microsoft
Windows NT as an operating system, and touch screen
functionality featuring pictures of candidates. [2] Brazil’s
2002 e-voting based elections were the world’s largest–
more than 115 million cast votes – until India’s May,
2004 elections when more than half of 670 millions
eligible voters cast their vote. India required over 725,
000 [3] voting machines to be delivered to their polling
stations, not an easy task under any circumstances, but
harder in a developing country.
The United States of America is another country trying
to automate the election process. Over the last decade
many resources have been dedicated to the provision of
secure and reliable voting machines. In the 2004
presidential elections more than two thirds of eligible
voters used some kind of electronic machine to cast their
votes. Along with their convenience, these voting
machines bring a litany of reports about existing
problems. There is no major newspaper or magazine that
has not published some account about the questionable
reliability of direct recording electronics (DREs). For
example, the Washington Post [4] reports that in Georgia,
some voters found that “when they pressed the screen to
vote for one candidate, the machine registered a vote for
the opponent”. In the state of Alabama, a 7,000-vote error
was caused by a computer glitch. The most controversial
dispute occurred over the correctness of the count and
inclusion of all voters' ballots in the 2000 U.S.
presidential election in Florida. [5] Because the US
citizens remember 2000 election debacle, their eyes are
turned towards Florida today. But the situation is no
different in Utah, Ohio, or any other state for that matter.
According to Aviel Rubin, a computer scientist at Johns
Hopkins University, “the use of computers puts elections
at the mercy of a few companies that make the machines.
The threat is that the vendors are in a position to make the
election come out any way they want, and it's virtually
undetectable". [6] Maybe the electronic processes will
record votes correctly, maybe the president in the current
round of US elections is the one the electorate wanted, but
maybe is not good enough for voters to place their trust in
a democratic system.
Printing a receipt for each voter might solve the
problem. A description of a system that utilizes a
verifiable paper trail in the voting process can be also
found in [7]. Known as the ‘Mercuri method’ it outlines
the steps that have to be taken in order to include
verifiable records in a final tallying. Having printers
installed with each voting machine would allow the voter
to see that the machine understood his/her intention
correctly, but it does not assure that the vote was counted
correctly. Moreover, Mercuri’s method does not prevent
the counting of unauthorized votes nor does it provide a
proof that all votes were included in a final tally.
3. VEV Verifiable E – Voting
To include a printer in each voting booth would be
difficult to execute: it would require a lot of resources to
install and support, and furthermore it would not increase
the trust in a system. On the other hand it is clear that
voters and candidates should have proof that their votes
were counted correctly. We have designed and
implemented an electronic voting system – Verifiable E-
Voting (VEV) - that allows voters and candidates to
verify correctness of their votes, while at the same time
the system’s underlying protocol secures the election
process from malicious practices.
The following voting system requirements were born
out of the desire to create a product that would allow
modern computer-based technology to truly embody those
secure properties that are valued by the public in their
voting. The purpose of our work is to make it impossible
for voting authorities to engage in a fraudulent behavior,
and at the same time the system will provide the secrecy
for the voters. It has been an attempt to provide a voting
system that would be:
anonymous – only voter knows his/her vote;
correct - it should not be possible for a vote to be altered,
or for a valid vote to be eliminated from the final tally, or
for an invalid vote to be counted in the final tally;
honest - no one should be able to vote twice or change the
vote of another voter;
public -  all results should be publicly known, but the
connection between votes and the voters should be both
unprovable and unknown. [9]
3.1 Specification of VEV
There are a number of conditions that have to be met
in order to provide voters with a secure electronic voting
system. Here we include the description of the general
steps that need to be taken in the design of the system to
provide the user with voting security. The general idea
that specifies the underlying protocol for the VEV design
has been introduced in [8]. The requirements for the
system follow.
Voting takes place over a computer network
VEV is designed to be implemented and used over an
existing computer network. The system includes three
major parts: the server-side program, client (voter) side
application and administrator (administrative user) side
software. The server-application should be stored and
executed on the main network computer. The client-
application could be located either on the main computer
or on every network’s terminal. It is recommended that,
for the security reasons, the administrator’s application
should be stored on the removable storage device (such as
floppy, CD), kept secure, and run only when changes are
being made to the voting procedure.
Only authorized voters can vote
Every voter is assigned a username and a unique
password. The administrator is responsible for choosing
the appropriate values for the name and password, since it
depends on the election importance as well as the election
settings.
The voter can cast only one vote
It is important for the system to ensure that it allows
each voter to cast one and only one vote. VEV also
provides the option of a re-vote to each user, and thus it is
important that the previous vote cast by a particular voter
will be erased when that user votes again.
Only the voter can know his/her vote
In democratic elections only the voter can know his or
her voting strategy: This is the secrecy requirement. There
cannot be a traceable link left between the voter and the
vote, and all processing links should disappear. It should
be impossible for anyone to recognize the voter by
looking at the ballots cast.
Each voter can check if his/her vote was counted
VEV offers a great enhancement to usual electronic
voting processes, in that every user can check if his/her
vote is in the ballot (which means it has been counted).
The system will provide the option to check the votes
(check the ballot), and the voting strategy identification
will be displayed. This means that users can count the
votes that were cast and can recognize their own vote
among the displayed votes.
Voters can change their minds
When the election process progresses, an individual
voter can become aware that the desired candidate was
not voted for, and thus the system provides the option to
re-vote. The system allows users to change their minds
multiple times, as VEV supports a multiple re-vote
function.
4. The underlying protocol
VEV uses the public-private key paradigm to encrypt
information. In this system, the user’s identification
number (id) and the voting strategy number (v) (which is
a numeral representation of the candidate’s name) are the
two prime numbers that are being used. There are three
different algorithms designed to perform calculations with
these two prime numbers and returning one large number
as a result. It is randomly chosen in the program which




The first function uses the multiplication function as
the underlying calculation. As a result, the product of two
prime numbers is returned.
Function 2
This function first calculates the product of two prime
numbers. Then it swaps the values of the individual bytes
within the binary representation of the product (namely
copies the value of last byte into the byte before the last,
and the value of the second last byte into the last byte).
The same swapping operation is done to the third and
fourth last byte of the product.
Function 3
This function first calculates the product of two prime
numbers. Then it flips (replaces with the complementary
value) the values of the individual bits within the binary
representation of the product. The algorithm changes the
values of bit positions: 3,6,7,12,15.
The fact that both of the prime numbers are randomly
generated for each user and for each voting strategy
provides great security for the system. The standard RSA
cryptosystem uses the same p  and q  throughout its
lifetime where in VEV the probability that the same two
numbers will be used twice is very close to zero. The
major part of the private key constitutes the fact that there
exists a system-defined index that uniquely identifies each
candidate. Even if the intruder is able to factor the voting
strategy function result, having two prime numbers would
not give him any reasonable answer. The secret lies in the
knowledge of indexing the candidates and having the
function inverses. For this particular reason the usage of
25-bit long prime numbers provides sufficient security to
the voting system. The prime numbers are being
generated using the constructor for BigInteger class from
the Java programming language library. The method
returns a randomly chosen, 25-bit long positive integer
that is a prime number. The probability that the newly
generated number represents a prime number will exceed
(1 - 1/2100). The execution time of this constructor is
proportional to the value of the probability parameter (in
our system the probability parameter is 100). In addition,
each newly created number is checked once again by
isPrime() function from the Java class library.
5. The Voting Scenario
In the remainder of this paper, ‘voter’ and ‘user’ are
synonymous, ‘server’ is used to describe the software
implemented and executed on the network’s main
computer and ‘client’ represents the computer program
that provides the graphical interface to the user, and
allows for communication between the server and the
voter.
5.1 Phase 1: Preparation
VEV publishes the number of eligible voters and the
deadline for the response.
Figure 1 Phase 1 – Confirmation interface
 In order to be able to vote, each voter has to confirm
(Figure 1) his intention to vote and only those who
respond will be allowed to cast the vote later. There will
be a specified period of time when the voters can respond.
5.2 Phase 2: Voting Scenario
When the date for the user’s response passes, the
system enters the phase of the main voting process. The
voting system running on the server is constantly waiting
for the user to connect. The voter starts using the system
by entering the username and the password that was
previously obtained from the system’s administrator (for
example this could be at a pre-voting booth for
authentication and password issuing at the voting site).
Then the system authenticates the user. If the system
recognizes the user it makes all functionality available to
this person (such as vote, re-vote or view the existing
votes, see: Figure 2). If the voter is not a recognized
person (either the username or the password does not
match the records) the user is treated as a guest to the
system and the only things that are available for viewing
are the existing votes.
Figure 2 Phase 2 – User can chose the action
If the recognized user chooses to cast the vote for the first
time the system creates the identification number for that
user.
When the eligible user wants to cast a vote for the first
time the client will randomly generate a 25-bit long prime
number (id) which will be used to uniquely identify that
particular user. In the next step of casting a vote the user
chooses the candidate that he wants to vote for. The
system displays the names of the election candidates and
the user chooses one of them.
The numerical encoding for every voting strategy (e.g.
name of candidate) should be a large prime number. The
voting system is able to handle as many as 24 candidates
to be voted for. The number 24 provides the opportunity
for the unique encryption of each voting strategy. First, all
numbers that end with 1,3,7,9 between 10 and 100 are
selected (the underlying reason for that is the fact that the
prime numbers end with 1, 3, 7, 9). This way a set of two
digit numbers has been created (hereafter called indexes).
For every index from the set, an election candidate is
assigned. When the user chooses to cast a vote for a
particular candidate, a random 25-bit prime number (v) is
generated such that the first digit is equal to the first digit
of the index and the last digit of v is the same as the last
digit of an index. E.g.: Say we have an election candidate
Anna S. Initially the system had assigned an index
identification number to her that is 51. If the voter decides
to cast the vote for Anna S. the client’s program will
randomly generate the prime number 5…..1 (first and last
digit match the index).
Next, the user sends the pair of integers (id, f (id, v)) to
the system where f is a randomly chosen encryption
function (one of three algorithms that are explained in
section 4); id is the identification tag generated for the
user, and v is the candidate’s name represented in the
number; f (id, v) is the result of the encrypting method
that takes id and v as its parameters. The system does not
know the connection between the username and the id tag
(or the voting strategy). The only association that is
known to the system is the connection between the id tag
and the vote function f (id, v). The user is asked to write
down (see: Figure 3) his identification number (id) and
the result of the voting strategy function. He is also
informed by the system to keep these numbers secret.
Figure 3 Phase 2 – voting procedure
When the server-side receives the numbers, it publishes
the voting function result to the screen.
After each vote is cast, the system publishes the voting
results. For each election candidate the system displays
f(id,v) to the screen. (see: Figure 4) This way the user can
check the correctness of his vote and the distribution of all
votes. Publishing the voting strategy will serve an
additional function. Every election candidate will be able
to check if the votes were counted correctly. This might
be of great importance for the candidates, because
elections have been known to be won by a difference of
just a few votes.
Figure 4 Phase 2,3 – Display of the election
results
Furthermore the listing, on a website for example, of the
total votes with voting function result for each candidate
as they are submitted to the system can prevent vote
buying.
6. The underlying algorithm
The primary advantage of public-key cryptography is
increased security and convenience. The private key never
needs to be transmitted or revealed to anyone. This
section explains the major steps that have to be taken in
order to implement VEV whose security is based on the
usage of the public-private key paradigm.
It has been assumed that the server is running on the main
computer and is constantly waiting for a client to connect.
It is also anticipated that every user possesses the
knowledge of his username and password. The italic type
characters will be used to indicate the processes occurring
on the server-side of the voting system.
6.1 Step 1: Authentication
1. Voter starts the execution of the client-side program.
2. Client asks the user to enter username. (see: Figure 5)
3. Server-side application checks if the name exists on
the list of users that are eligible to vote.
4. If the name exists, the user is asked to enter the
allocated password; otherwise the user is considered
to be system’s guest.
5. In case that the username exists, the server checks if
the password matches the username (if the password
does not match, the user is considered to be a guest).
Figure 5 User authentication
6.2 Step 2: User operations
Phase 1 (the time allocated to acknowledge user-
responses with the willingness to vote)
1. Client displays the number of users that are eligible to
cast a vote.
2. User chooses the option to confirm voting or the
option to exit.
3. If user chooses to confirm voting the server records
user’s willingness to vote.
4. Client displays the “Thank you” message and informs
the user about voting dates.
Phase 2 (the time allocated for the actual voting)
User chooses to vote
Server checks (using username and password) if the user
has voted already.
1. If the user did not cast his vote yet, the client randomly
generates a 25-bit long prime number and assigns it
as an identification number to that particular voter.
2. The message is displayed on the screen asking the user
to take a note of this number and not to reveal it to
anyone.
3. Client displays the names of the election candidates,
and asks the user to choose one of them.
4. User types in the number of the candidate for whom he
wants to cast the vote.
5. Client randomly generates a 25-bit long prime number
called voting strategy that meets the index
specification.
6. Client performs one of the encrypting functions (called
also a voting function; there is a random choice made
to use one of the three available encrypting methods)
on the user’s identification tag and the voting strategy
number.
7. Client displays the result of voting function to the user.
The user is asked to write the number down and to
keep it confidential.
8. Client sends the pair (identification tag, voting
function result) to the server.
9. Server stores the vote information in its database.
10. Server records that the user voted already. It is done
to prevent the user from casting multiple votes.
11. When the user chooses to exit, client disconnects and
the link between username and his vote disappears.
If the user previously cast the vote, he is asked to choose
the re-vote option.
User chooses to re-vote
1. Client asks the user for his identification tag number.
2. Client asks the user for his voting function.
3. Server checks if the vote exists.
4. Client displays the names of the election candidates,
and asks the user to choose one of them.
5. User types in the number of the candidate for whom
he wants to cast the new vote.
6. Client randomly generates a 25-bit voting strategy
that meets the index specification.
7. Client performs one of the encrypting functions on
the user’s identification tag and the voting strategy
number.
8. Client displays the result of voting function to the
user. The user is asked to write the number down and
to keep it confidential.
9. Client sends the pair (identification tag, voting
function result) to the server.
10. Server stores new vote in its database and erases the
old vote.
User chooses to check the votes
Client displays all the voting functions to the screen.
The votes are displayed in such a way, that for every
candidate the voting function numbers are displayed in an
ascending order. The user can check if his/her vote was
counted correctly, and the election candidates can verify
the voting results.
User chooses to exit
1. Client displays the “Goodbye” message
2. Client disconnects from the server
7. Conclusion
Voting software cannot be treated in the same way as a
word processor or other applications, as we have even less
reason to blindly trust the vendor – especially when the
whole country’s future is at stake. Most of the recent
news about harnessing electronics for the election process
has been bad. While much work in the USA is aimed at
strengthening the ever-tight security around the software
source code (it has been suggested that the voting
application source code could not be reviewed even if
challenged in court), in Australia there is a contrary
approach with the voting code being made public. It is
often argued [e.g. 9], that the only way to have a
trustworthy system is to open the source code of
cryptographic functions to the public. The algorithm can
really be considered secure when is examined by many
experts. Schneier [14] says: “… [t]he only way to have
any confidence in an algorithm's security is to have
experts examine it.”[10] Australian officials believe that
elections can benefit from involving the voters in the
software development process. The voters can dictate the
requirements including security and functionality of the
voting system. No matter how many election flaws are
found, and despite their severity, electronic voting
systems are here to stay and serve us all. The only
question remains: “How much, or little, trust can we
afford?”
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